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INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE1
Knowledge Ecology International (“KEI”) is 
an international nonprofit, nongovernmental 
organization that searches for better outcomes, 
including new solutions, to the management of 
knowledge resources.  In particular, KEI is 
focused on the management of these resources in 
the context of social justice.  KEI is drawn to 
areas where current business models and 
practices by businesses, governments or other 
actors fail to adequately address social needs or 
where there are opportunities for substantial 
improvements.  Among other areas, KEI has 
expertise in access to medicines and medical 
technologies.
KEI is concerned about the implications of 
the Federal Circuit decision in the present case 
because it will have far-reaching consequences for 
the future of patent law and public health.  As an 
advocate of new incentive and financing models 
for biomedical innovation and the proponent of 
several mechanisms for stimulating investments 
and promoting innovation outside of the patent 
regime, KEI has concerns that the Federal Circuit 
decision in the present case ignores these 
1 The parties have consented to the filing of this brief. 
Counsel of record for all parties received notice at least 10 
days prior to the due date of the amicus curiae's intention to 
file this brief.  No counsel representing any party to the case 
authored this brief in whole or in part and no counsel or 
party made any monetary contribution to the preparation or 
submission of the brief.  
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alternatives and focuses exclusively on patent 
rewards.  If the Federal Circuit decision is allowed 
to stand, that decision could stifle innovation and 
negatively impact patients as well as future 
innovation.
SUMMARY
The present case presents a question that is 
of fundamental importance for the future of the 
future of patent law and will have impacts on 
public health.  Little guidance as to whether 
human genes are patentable exists as the lower 
court decision resulted in a fractured, splintered 
opinion and the Executive Branch is also divided 
in this area.
The goal of the patent system is to 
encourage the progress of science.  However, if the 
Federal Circuit decision is allowed to stand, this 
goal will be contravened and the progress of 
science will be hindered.  Furthermore, the lower 
court decision ignores the numerous non-patent 
mechanisms that can provide a more appropriate 
reward for the isolation of human genes.
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REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
I. THE QUESTION OF WHETHER HUMAN 
GENES ARE PATENTABLE RAISES 
FUNDAMENTALLY IMPORTANT 
CONSEQUENCES FOR THE FUTURE OF 
PATENT LAW.
A. The Legal Community Needs Guidance 
With Regard to the Applicability of 
Section 101 to DNA
No clear reasoning exists with regard to the 
applicability of Section 101 to DNA because the 
four federal judges that have previously 
considered this case have each had different 
opinions in reliance on different reasoning.  The 
Federal Circuit in Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. 
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329 
(2011) resulted in a three-way split in reasoning 
and no true majority reasoning emerged. 
Although two of the three of the judges hearing 
the case agreed that isolated DNA fragments are 
patentable, they arrived at their conclusion using 
drastically different reasoning.  Significantly, all 
three Federal Circuit judges hearing the case 
relied upon this Court’s decision in Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty in coming to its conclusion.  447 
U.S. 303 (1980).  Thus, all three judges reached 
different conclusions and provided for different 
3
interpretations of Chakrabarty, giving the legal 
community little guidance in this area.
Without a true majority opinion, it is 
immensely difficult for the legal community to 
grasp the holding of this case or apply it to future 
cases.  This Court has in fact opined that when no 
single rationale explaining the decision is agreed 
upon by the majority of judges, the holding of the 
court should be viewed as the position taken by 
the concurring judgments on the narrowest 
ground.   Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 
193 (1977).  However, the poorly defined 
“narrowest ground” doctrine is often impossible to 
apply.  See Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738 
(1944); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 
(1996).  The confusion created from interpreting 
splintered and fractured decisions is in “itself a 
reason to reexamine that decision.”   Nichols at 
745-46.
This case represents a novel question for 
this Court because although it has heard several 
patent cases regarding method patents, it has not 
addressed the patentability of human DNA. 
Furthermore, not since its ruling in Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) has it 
addressed compositions of matter under 35 U.S.C. 
Section 101.  It is critical for this Court to clarify 
not only the bounds of Section 101, but also the 
application of Chakrabarty to products such as
4
human genes and isolated DNA.  Given the 
advances of technology and science over the past 
thirty years and continuing growth of 
biotechnology and other sectors, this case is ripe 
for this Court’s consideration.
B. Even the Executive Branch is 
Fragmented and Divided With Regard to 
Patentablity of Genes
In addition to the highly fractured and 
divided opinions of the four lower court judges 
who have decided the present case, the Executive 
branch is also fragmented with regard to the 
patentability of genes and isolated DNA.  Although 
the USPTO granted the patents-at-issue and 
authorized the patenting of isolated DNA, when 
the present case reached the Federal Circuit, 
USPTO did not sign the brief submitted on behalf 
of the United States.  Br. for the United States as 
Amicus Curiae in Supp. Of Neither Party, Ass’n 
for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329 (F3d. Cir. 2011) 
(No. 2010-1406).  The brief submitted by the 
United States as amicus curiae took the position 
that isolated DNA and human genes could not 
receive patent protection, though cDNA remained 
patent eligible.  Id. at 1.  The Solicitor General 
argued this position on behalf of the United States 
during oral arguments before the Federal Circuit.
As noted by Judge Bryson’s dissenting 
opinion, the USPTO’s position was “substantially 
undermined by the position the government has 
5
taken in this case”  when the Department of 
Justice advocated for the exclusion of isolated 
DNA from patentability.  While both the USPTO 
and Department of Justice are part of the 
Executive Branch, the decision to intervene in the 
case at the appellate level suggests a change in 
position from the time USPTO granted of the 
patents-at-issue to the present.
With the Executive Branch providing 
conflicting views on whether the claims-at-issue 
should receive patent protection, coupled with the 
highly fragmented three-way split in reasoning by 
the Federal Circuit, no clear guidance exists with 
regard to the patentability of human genes and 
isolated DNA.  It is therefore necessary for this 
Court to provide guidance in this area as to the 
patent eligibility of the claims-at-issue and the 
scope of Section 101.
C. The question as to whether human genes 
or isolated DNA is patent eligible will 
have far-reaching effects on genetic 
research, medical innovations, the future 
of patent law and public health.
As noted above, uncertainty exists as to the 
bounds of Section 101 and the applicability of the 
reasoning under Chakrabarty.  While all three 
Federal Circuit judges relied upon Chakrabarty in
6
reaching his or her decision, each interpreted this 
case differently which resulted in a three-way split 
in reasoning.  The ambiguity of this holding 
creates uncertainty not only for the specific 
claims-at-issue, but also for the future of genetic 
research. 
The impact of the Federal Circuit decision 
not only implicates alternative testing for the 
BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, but also for future 
research and development with respect to these 
and other patented genes.  Scientists and 
researchers have expressed reluctance to conduct 
research and development where patents on genes 
exist because of fear of possible litigation. 
Patients will, predictably, face harm as a 
result of the Federal Circuit ruling.  Specifically, 
patients wishing to undergo diagnostic testing for 
the BRCA1 and BRCA2 gene whose insurance 
does not cover the test must make a choice to pay 
Myriad’s monopoly price of more than $3,000 or 
forego the diagnostic.  Myriad, because it owns an 
exclusive monopoly over the genes, can prevent all 
research on the BRCA 1 and BRCA2 genes.  This 
monopoly operates to the detriment of the public 
who cannot obtain a second opinion even where, 
for example, Myriad’s test had a twelve-percent 
error rate or failed to identify all known mutations 
of the gene.  See Tom Walsh, et. al., Spectrum of 
Mutations in BRCA1, BRCA2, CHECK2, and TP53 
in Families at High Risk of Breast Cancer, 295 
JAMA 1369, 1386 (2006).
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The impact of this case extends beyond the 
BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, even when narrowly 
evaluated in the context of Myriad’s claims-at-
issue.  A study performed by Duke University’s 
Department of Biostatistics and Bioinformatics 
found that the patents-at-issue would preempt a 
broad range of genetic tests, extending beyond 
those directly linked to BRCA1 and BRCA 2 
research.  Thomas B. Kepler, et. al., 
Metastatasizing patent claims on BRCA1, 
Genomics (May 2010), available at 
http://www.elsevier.com/framework_products/pr
omis_misc/kepler_crossman_cook_deegan.pdf. 
One of the claims upheld by the Federal Circuit 
broadly covers fifteen nucleotides that occur on 
the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, but which also 
occur elsewhere in the genome.  Id. at 2-3. 
Therefore, the impacts even in the narrower 
context of the patents claimed in the present case 
will affect diagnostic testing beyond the BRCA1 
and BRCA2 genes.
II. THE GOAL OF THE PATENT SYSTEM IS 
TO ENCOURAGE PROGRESS AND THE 
IMPACT OF THE PATENT ELIGIBILITY OF 
HUMAN GENES IS CRITICAL TO THE 
PROGRESS OF SCIENCE AND USEFUL 
ARTS AND TO THE PUBLIC HEALTH. 
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A. Where Patent Protection Improperly 
Preempts All Other Uses, Progress of 
Science Is Hindered
The Constitutional rationale for allowing 
Congress to create laws permitting inventors to 
have a limited monopoly over their inventions is to 
“promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” 
U.S. Const. art. 1, §8, cl. 8.  The Constitution 
thus sets forth the goal of advancing scientific 
progress and the “embarrassment of an exclusive 
patent” is justified only because these monopolies 
serve the “benefit of society.”   Graham v. John 
Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 7-10 (1966) (quoting 
Thomas Jefferson (internal citation omitted)).
It is well settled that, although Congress 
has wide latitude in creating patent laws, it  “may 
not overreach the restraints imposed by the stated 
constitutional purposes.”  Graham v. John Deere 
Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966).  Indeed, although the 
Constitution grants Congress the power to make 
patent laws, the clause “is both a grant of power 
and a limitation.  This qualified authority . . . is 
limited to the promotion of advances in the useful 
arts.”   Id. at 5 (emphasis added).  The 
Constitutional standard for patent law, that is to 
promote progress, “may not be ignored.”  Id. At 6.
As a result of this limitation, this Court has 
found that patents may not be granted where the 
effect would be “to remove existent knowledge 
from the public domain, or to restrict free access 
to materials already available.”   Id.  This Court 
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has repeatedly recognized the limits of 
patentability and “the laws of nature, physical 
phenomena, and abstract ideas have been held 
not patentable.”   Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 
U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 
U.S. 584 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 
67 (1972); Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo 
Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948); O’Reilly 
v. Morse, 56 U.S. 112, 121 (1854); Le Roy v. 
Tatham, 55 U.S. 175 (1853)).  Mere discoveries of 
naturally occurring objects may not receive patent 
protection.  Id. at 312-313 (Objects found in 
nature and unaided by the hand of man “must be 
free to all mankind”  and a “new mineral or plant 
discovered in the wild would not be patent 
eligible.”).  Thus, a newly discovered mineral or 
Newton’s law of gravity are “manifestations of . . . 
nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to 
none.”  Chakrabarty at 309 (citing Funk Brothers, 
333 U.S. 130 (internal quotations omitted).
Furthermore, monopolies that prohibit all 
others from creating the same effect or process by 
any other means effectively discourages scientific 
progress and contravenes the policy of the Patent 
Act.  Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (1853). 
More recently, in the case, Bilski v. Kappos, this 
Court noted that preemption remains an 
important factor in determining the scope of 
patentability under Section 101 of the Patent Act. 
130 S.Ct. 3218 (2010).  Here, patent protection on
10
the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes completely 
forecloses and preempts all other uses of the 
product, thereby contravening the purpose of the 
patent system. 
B. Products of Nature, Laws of Nature and 
Natural Phenomena, Such as the Claims-
At-Issue Are Not Patent-Eligible
This Court, in applying Section 101 of the 
Patent Act to compositions of matter, determined 
that three specific types of claims have been 
categorically removed from patent eligibility. 
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 
(1980).  These claims include “the laws of nature, 
physical phenomena, and abstract ideas.”   Id. 
See also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 
(1981).
In his opinion, Judge Lourie incorrectly 
suggested that a categorical rule excluding 
isolated genes from patent eligibility could not be 
supported by this Court’s jurisprudence which 
“repeatedly rejected new categorical exclusions 
from §101’s scope.”  Ass’n Molecular Pathology at 
1353.  However, this Court has in fact excluded 
entire categories of subject matters from patent 
eligibility in its previous jurisprudence 
interpreting the bounds of Section 101 and the 
Federal Circuit decision ignores such precedent.
Of particular applicability to the present 
case, and as noted above, this Court has held all 
natural phenomena, laws of nature and abstract 
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ideas ineligible for patent protection.  Chakrabarty 
at 309; Dieher at 185; Funk Bros. Seeds Co. v. 
Kalo Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948).  In addition to 
excluding this wide category of objects from 
patentability, this Court has also made specific 
exclusions.  For example, wood pulp and paper 
pulp were denied patentability as objects known 
to be in existence prior to the patent claims. 
American Wood Paper Co. v. Fiber Disintegrating 
Co., 90 U.S. 566 (1874).
Under such jurisprudence, lower federal 
courts have similarly made exclusions from 
patentability, particularly for purified materials or 
objects obtained through extraction without 
further human processing.  Such exclusions 
include purified uranium, In re Marden, 47 F.2d 
957 (C.C.P.A. 1931), purified vanadium, In re 
Marden, 47 F.2d 958 (1931), purified tungsten, 
Gen. Elec. Co. v. De Forest Radio Co., 28 F.2d 641 
(3d Cir. 1928), and vitamin C that was purified 
from lemon juice, In re King, 107 F.2d 618 
(C.C.P.A. 1939), among others.  Thus, while these 
lower courts did not specifically invalidate 
wholesale categories of subject matter from patent 
eligibility, these cases, in the aggregate, illustrate 
an exclusion of naturally occurring substances 
from patentability.
The present case, involving purified or 
isolated DNA, represents products that are merely
12
naturally occurring phenomena.  They have been 
obtained through extraction and, while involving 
human effort to isolate the DNA, the claims 
represent no more than products of nature.  The 
isolated BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes are not 
markedly different from those found in nature 
and, as a result, should not receive patent 
protection.  The limitation of our patent system 
excluding products of nature is necessary to 
ensure that the purpose of the patent regime—to 
promote the progress of science—is fulfilled and 
that unnecessary roadblocks to future research 
and development are not erected.
III. NON-PATENT MECHANISMS CAN AND 
SHOULD ENCOURAGE PROGRESS WHERE 
PATENTS ARE AN INAPPROPRIATE, 
UNNECESSARY, INSUFFICIENT, OR 
BURDENSOME REWARD
The most common and superficially 
appealing justifications for liberal standards to 
patentable subject matter are those that assert, 
without evidence, that the necessity of patents is 
to protect and reward investments in the 
development of new products.     
The false argument that patents are 
necessary to protect investments is belied both by 
the known shortcomings of patents as an 
incentive mechanism, and the growing 
proliferation of non-patents mechanisms to 
stimulate R&D. 
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In certain areas of innovation, patents do 
not provide adequate incentives for research and 
development and other mechanisms to reward 
innovation are needed.  Also, with respect to the 
claims-at-issue, patent protection can  effectively 
blocks further research and development, and 
discourage investments.  
A report by the Department of Health and 
Human Services Advisory Committee on Genetics, 
Health, and Society concluded that gene patents 
were not necessary to provide incentives for 
research or development of clinical testing.   Dep’t 
of Health & Human Serv., Sec’y’s Advisory Comm. 
On Genetics, Health, and Soc’y, Gene Patents and 
Licensing Practices and Their Impact on Patient 
Access to Genetic Tests (Apr. 2010), available at 
http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/sacghs/reports/SACG
HS_patents_report_2010.pdf.  This report also 
noted that gene patents harmed patient access to 
genetic testing and denied quality assurance of 
such tests. Id.  Because patents provide an 
inappropriate and burdensome incentive in the 
case of isolated-DNA or human genes, other 
mechanisms should be explored.
A wide range of non-patent incentives exist 
to encourage research and discovery. 
Mechanisms to protect, reward and induce 
investment into innovation across broad sectors, 
such as trade secret protection, often take the
14
place of patent incentives.  Trade secrets, while 
having their own shortcomings in terms of limiting 
access to knowledge, are  used to promote 
investments in new medical products, including in 
particular, for medical diagnostic technologies and 
biotechnology drugs.  Iraj Daizadeh, et. al., A 
general approach for determining when to patent, 
publish, or protect information as a trade secret, 20 
Nat. Biotech1053-1054 (2002). 
Beyond trade secret protections are a wide 
range  of  new  sui  generis  forms  of  intellectual 
property  that  are used in parallel  to the patent 
system, and often when patent protection is not 
available.  One type of sui generis protection that 
has become quite  common is  the application of 
time  limited  exclusive  rights  to   rely  upon  test 
data  used  to  register  new  drugs  or  vaccines. 
Food,  Drug  and  Cosmetics  Act,  New Drugs,  21 
U.S.C. §355.  These rights include 5 years of test 
data  protection  for  new  chemical  entity 
pharmaceutical  products,  and  12  years  of  test 
data  protection  for  new  biologic  drugs.    Id. 
Another type of non-patent  right is the marketing 
exclusivity  granted  for  the  development  of  new 
“orphan”  drug  indications,  or  to  reward 
investments in clinical trials for pediatric patents. 
Internal Revenue Code, Clinical testing expenses 
for certain drugs for rare diseases or conditions, 
26 U.S.C. §45C.   The U.S. Government gives a 50 
percent tax credit for investments in clinical trials 
for  orphan  drugs,  and  the  U.S.  Congress  is 
considering legislation to grant 5 years of market 
exclusivity  for  new  antibiotic  drugs,  that  would 
work as either as a supplement to or independent 
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of  patent  protection.   Id.   To  simulate  R&D in 
treatments  for  rare  tropical  diseases,  the  U.S. 
Congress  has  created  a  new  “Priority  Review 
Voucher,” that provides for a transferable right to 
an  accelerated  consideration  of  new  drug 
approvals  as a reward for  registration drugs for 
treatments  like  cholera  or  leprosy.   Food,  Drug 
and Cosmetic  Act,  Priority  Review to  Encourage 
Treatments  for  Tropical  Diseases,  21  U.S.C. 
§360n.
In addition to these existing and expanding 
mechanisms, a new class of  reward investment in 
medical research and development are under 
consideration, both internationally and 
domestically, that involve cash innovation 
inducement prizes, to stimulate investments in 
public health, and other areas of public and 
private interest.2
2 See, e.g., James Love & Tim Hubbard, The Big Idea: Prizes 
to Stimulate R&D for New Medicines, 82 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 
1521-24 (2007); James Love & Tim Hubbard, Prizes for 
Innovation of New Medicines and Vaccines, 18 Annals Health 
L. 155-186 (2009); Brian D. Wright, The Economics of 
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73 American Economic Review 691-707(1983); Burton 
Weisbrod, Solving the Drug Dilemma, Wash. Post (Aug. 22, 
2003) at A21; T. Kalil, Hamilton Project and Brookings 
Institution, Prizes for Technological Innovation (2006); Bruce 
G. Charlton, Mega-Prizes in Medicine: Big Cash Awards May 
Stimulate Useful and Rapid Therapuetic Innovation, 68 
Medical Hypotheses 1-3 (2007); L. Brunt, J. Lerner & T. 
Nicholas, Inducement Prizes and Innovation (2008); Selected 
Innovation and Reward Programs, KEI Research Note 
2008:1; K. Davidian, Prizes, Prize Culture and NASA’s 
Centennial Challenges (2004); Julien Penin, Patents versus 
ex post rewards: A new look, 34 Research Pol'y 641 (2005); 
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for new proposals to  incentivize research and 
development “addressing the de-linkage of the 
costs of research and developments and the price 
of health products and methods for tailoring the 
optimal mix of incentives to a particular condition 
or product with the objective of addressing 
diseases that disproportionate affect developing 
countries.”  Global strategy and plan of action on 
public health, innovation and intellectual 
property, World Health Assembly 61.21 (2008). 
Such de-linkage includes the awards of prizes.  Id. 
at Annex, element 5.3(a).
In the 112th Congress, two bills were 
introduced in the Senate that proposed large cash 
prizes as an alternative to an exclusive patent 
monopoly, including  S.  1137  and  S.  1138. 
Medical Innovation Prize Fund Act, S.1137, 112th
J.G. Morgan, Inducing Innovation Through Prizes, 3 
Innovations: Technology, Governance, Globalization 105 
(2008); W.A. Masters, Prizes for innovation in African 
agriculture: a framework document (2004), available at 
http://ww.eart.columbia.edu/cgsd/prizes; Joseph E. 
Stiglitz, Scrooge and Intellectual Property Rights: A Medical 
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333 British Medical Journal, 129 (2006); Ron Marchant, 
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Knowledge Ecology Studies (2008); James Love, The Role of 
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Cong.  (2011);  Prize  Fund  for  HIV/AIDS  Act, 
S.1138,  112th Cong. (2011).   One of these bills 
would apply to all prescription drugs, while the 
other would limit its application to HIV/AIDS 
drugs. 
Prizes may be particularly relevant in areas 
where products are not eligible for patents or 
where it would be inefficient or harmful to permit 
exclusive monopoly rights to be enforced.  Areas 
where unrestricted access to basic information or 
discoveries is critical to the  progress of science, 
patents act as a barrier to further innovation and 
do more harm than good.  See John Sulston & 
Georgina Ferry, The Common Thread (2003); 
Aaron S. Kesselhein & Jerry Avorn, University 
Based Science and Biotechnology Products: 
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293 JAMA 850-54 (2005).
In the present case, patents are not an 
appropriate mechanism for rewarding investments 
in the isolation of DNA or the identification of 
genes.  Patents in the area of human genes are 
burdensome, foreclosing future research and 
development and preempting all other uses of the 
gene in direct contradiction to the purposes of the 
patent system.  Thus, other, more viable forms of 
incentives exist and should be used to reward 
research and development in this area and 
stimulate innovation. 
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CONCLUSION
The U.S. patent system operates to provide 
incentives for research and development, but is 
not without its limits.  This case presents 
questions that are fundamentally important to the 
patent system, the future of research and 
development and public health.  No clear 
guidance has emerged from the lower court 
decisions in the case and, essentially, a four-way 
split in reasoning exists with regard to the 
application of this Court’s precedent and the 
language of Section 101.  Moreover, the lower 
court decision ignores the fact that alternative 
incentive mechanisms exist to incentivize research 
and development in areas where a patent 
monopoly does not provide an appropriate reward.
For the reasons stated above, this Court 
should grant the petition for certiorari.
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